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MACHESKY V.

BIZZELL

The Anti-Injunction Statute And The First Amendment:
The Yielding Of A Statute
Machesky v. Bizzell'
The "Greenwood Movement," a civil rights group active in Greenwood, Mississippi, was prohibited as a class from picketing, marching,
or demonstrating by a state court injunction. The injunction was
obtained by local merchants who claimed that their businesses were
being damaged by the picketing. In response to this action, members
of the "Movement" brought suit in the federal district court seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.2 They claimed that their
picketing activities were protected under the first and fourteenth amendments as well as under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 19 6 8 ,' and
that therefore the state court injunction should be vacated as violative
of their rights.
The district court 4 refused to grant relief, reasoning that it was
constrained by the federal anti-injunction statute' from interfering
with state judicial proceedings except where Congress had expressly
granted the power.' The court reasoned that since there was no decision
in the fifth circuit holding that the Civil Rights Acts were expressly
authorized exceptions to the anti-injunction statute, it "must be guided
by the basic considerations of equity and comity which underlie the
Anti-Injunction Statute. . .

.,,

The court recognized that the prin-

1. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
2. Federal jurisdiction was based on a federal question raised by the alleged
violation of § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code dealing with deprivations of
rights secured by the Constitution "under color of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964).

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

4. Machesky v. Bizzell, 288 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964): "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments."
6. Id. This power was given only in the three specific instances enumerated in
the statute.

7. 288 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
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ciples of comity may be forced to yield in the extraordinary case where
grave injury would result from the infringement of constitutional
rights at a state proceeding. It decided, however, that the circumstances
presented did not constitute the required "extraordinary case," and
hence no relief was granted.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded,' holding that since
individuals were being deprived of their first amendment rights by
an overbroad state judicial order, this was one of the rare cases where
federal interference was warranted. The basis for this view seems to
stem from the privileged status and public nature of the rights in
question. 9 Previous courts, by construing the anti-injunction statute
as a legislative enactment of the principles of comity, have used this
flexible doctrine to create many exceptions to the statutory language.' °
Thus the court of appeals had much precedent for allowing another
exception; i.e., that first amendment rights are more important than
the principles of comity and that state proceedings may be enjoined
to protect them. It left unanswered, however, the question of whether
the Civil Rights Acts represent an "expressly authorized" exception to
the anti-injunction statute."
The significance of the decision lies in its effect on the courts
as well as on the anti-injunction statute itself. It may be that the
many exceptions now carved from an admittedly unclear statute 2
render it completely ineffective. Also, logical extensions of the holding
in Machesky, permitting additional exceptions to section 2283, could
have disruptive effects on state courts as well as overloading federal
courts. Dissatisfied litigants in state proceedings would turn directly
to the federal courts rather than pursue their rights of appeal within
the state system. This note will examine these considerations in light
of the legislative history of the statute and its interpretation in
prior cases.
I.

HISTORY OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION

STATUTE

The power of the federal courts to interefere in state court proceedings was first limited by statute in 1793.'" Prior to that time
only the common law principles of comity controlled federal court
8. 414 F.2d at 283.
9. These rights constitute the important public interests in the full dissemination
of public expression on public issues and courts have protected them to the fullest
extent. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1965).
10. See notes 31-38 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
12. Cf. Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 726, 740 (1961).
13. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334. There was actually no express
power given to federal courts to issue writs of injunction although such power was
probably included in the general grant of power. It may have been, therefore, that
federal courts were impotent in equity until they were given specific injunctive power
in 1793. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Warren, Federal and State
Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 345, 347 (1930).
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action. The original statute was without exception; it expressly stated
that a federal writ of injunction should not be granted to stay proceedings in state courts.14 Although there has been much speculation
as to the reasons precipitating the passage of this provision of the
Act of March 2, 1793, the most probable suggestion is that it reflected
the prevailing prejudices of the time against equity jurisdiction.'5 The
opposition of the states to the extension of federal jurisdiction, intensified by the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,"6 may have added fuel
to the fire. Regardless of the underlying influences, however, the
statute seemed to express a basic congressional policy which continues
today -1 7 the avoidance of needless friction between state and federal
courts.

There were few legislative changes to the anti-injunction statute
prior to its 1948 revision.
Only two express exceptions to the
statute, then section 265 of the Judicial Code,' 9 were enacted, and
only one of these was incorporated within the wording of the statute
itself. In 1874 the statute was revised to except injunctions authorized
by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy from the prohibition
of the statute.2 0 This revision was a result of a conflict between the
Bankruptcy Act of 186721 and the anti-injunction statute. The Bankruptcy Act, although providing that other actions pending against a
bankrupt could be "stayed" by the bankruptcy court, left doubt as to
whether it granted to federal courts the power to enjoin state court
proceedings. The revision settled this doubt. The Interpleader Act
of 192622 provided the second express exception to the anti-injunction
statute. This Act specifically empowers the federal court to enjoin
claimants of the interpleaded fund from bringing suit in any state
court. While the anti-injunction statute was neither mentioned in, nor
14.

".

. . nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any

court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334-5.

15. The legislative history of the statute is exceedingly sparse. Some authors
have suggested that the provision was undoubtedly the consequence of a report by
Attorney General Edmund Randolph to the House of Representatives in 1790 recommending changes in the existing Judiciary Act of 1789. Others have decided that it
may have been a result of congressional apprehension at the danger of federal jurisdiction encroaching upon that of the states. The most adhered-to view, however, is
that stated in the text - prejudice against equity jurisdiction. See Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-32 (1941); Taylor & Willis, The Power of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1171
(1933) ; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. RZv. 345, 347-50
(1930).
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
17. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957) ; Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939); Essanay
Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358, 360 (1922) ; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254
U.S. 175, 183 (1920); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L.
Rev. 345, 372-77 (1930).
18. Compare Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334-35 with Act of March
3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
19. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
20. Riv. STrAT. § 720 (1874).
21. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 21, 14 Stat. 526.
22. Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, 2361 (1964).
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amended because of, the Interpleader Act,
the express language therein
23
can only be read as an exception to it.

Additional legislative exceptions to the statute were created by
implication in other congressional acts. The Removal Acts24 which
under certain circumstances authorize the removal of cases beginning
in state courts to federal courts, were probably the impetus for the first
departure from the anti-injunction statute. For many years, it was
unclear what action might be taken by a federal court if a state court
refused removal. In French v. Hay,25 the Supreme Court finally decided that the statutory language implied that an injunction was permissible action to protect the federal court's jurisdiction. Later cases
have firmly established that where a suit has been properly removed, a
federal court may issue an injunction to prevent any further action in
the state court. 26 Other exceptions to the anti-injunction statute have
been implied from the Act of 1851 limiting the liability of shipowners,2 7
the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act, 2s and the Emergency Price
Control Act.2 9 Each of these enactments contains language which
prohibits the bringing of certain court actions, hence each requires
equitable enforcement to be effective. The federal courts evidently
reasoned that if the anti-injunction statute prevented the enjoining
of state court actions prohibited in the enactment, enforcement of the
enactments would be virtually impossible. They were able, therefore,
to read into these enactments implied exceptions to the anti-injunction
statute in much the same manner as did the court in French v. Hay."
23. See Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35
L. RWv. 545, 559 (1947) ; Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court
Proceedings,74 HARv. L. Rzv. 726 (1961).
CA.lF.

24. Originally the removal power of federal courts was set forth in the Judiciary

Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Now this federal power is codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1450 (1964).
25. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1875).

26. See, e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S.
239 (1905); Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
in State Courts, 42 YAIt L.J. 1169, 1172-1175 (1933).
27. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), formerly ch. 43, § 4, 9 Stat. 635 (1851). This act
limits the liability of a shipowner to the value of his vessel. The specific language of
the enactment states that after the owner has taken certain action, "all . . . proceedings against [him] . . . shall cease." Federal courts have interpreted this as allowing injunctions against state court proceedings contravening the act despite the antiinjunction statute. See, e.g.,, Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S.
578, 599 (1883).
28. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 75, 47 Stat. 1470. This act put a farmer and
his property under exclusive federal jurisdiction once a petition for relief had been
filed in a federal court. It provides that after such a filing, proceedings against the
farmer or his property "shall not be instituted or . . . maintained in any court."
Federal courts have ruled that this too allowed the enjoining of state proceedings.
See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
29. Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 205, 56 Stat. 33. This section allowed the
administrator of the Office of Price Administration to secure injunctions against the
violation of his orders in any court. It has been held that an injunction could issue
against state proceedings which sought to enjoin the issuance of a rent order under
the Act. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
This exception may also have been reached based on exclusive federal jurisdiction as with the Frazier-Lemke Act. See Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946);
Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALI. L.
IRv. 545, 560-62 (1947).
30. See notes 24-26 supra.
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This type of reasoning typifies the attitude that federal courts had taken
toward the anti-injunction statute. Rather than require Congress to
include express language dealing with the equitable enforcement of
the statutes they pass, the courts simply read implied injunctive powers
into them, at the expense of the statute. Such interpretative analysis has
allowed subsequent congressional action to operate almost outside the
scope of the anti-injunction statute.
The courts themselves fashioned many exceptions to the antiinjunction statute without the aid of legislative enactments. The judgemade exceptions, along with the implied legislative exceptions, had,
in the eyes of some commentators, reduced the anti-injunction statute
to a "thing of threads and patches." 1 Two of the most familiar
departures allowing injunctions against state court proceedings are
the in rem exception3 and the relitigation exception. 3 The former
recognizes that a federal court may enjoin state litigation dealing with
a res which was first under federal jurisdiction, while the latter permits
injunctions to prevent the relitigation of issues in state courts which
have already been decided in federal courts. Federal courts have also
allowed the enjoining of state proceedings in cases where fraudulently
obtained state court judgments are sought to be enforced 34 and where
an unconstitutional state statute has deprived a citizen of his rights."3
Finally, in instances where an injunction could be considered ancillary
to the relief sought 6 and in cases where the United States itself is
31. E.g., Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
in State Courts, 42 YAmE L.J. 1169, 1172 (1933).
32. It has been recognized in a long line of cases that when a court, whether
federal or state, takes possession of, or jurisdiction over, a res, the res is withdrawn
from the reach of the other. See Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, (1858) ;
Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836). This view, however, does not apply
to in personam actions. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). It is
well settled now that the anti-injunction statute does not preclude the enjoining of
state proceedings over a res which was under prior federal jurisdiction. See Lion
Bonding & Sur. Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1923) ; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.S. 226, 229, 235 (1922); Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904);
Sharon v. Terry, 36 F. 337 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888), aff'd, 131 U.S. 40 (1889).

33. On the theory of protecting federal jurisdiction, the courts have allowed
injunctions to prevent the relitigation in state courts of issues already decided in federal courts. E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1920); Dial
v. Reynolds, 96 U.S. 340 (1877). Contra, Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118, 137-139 (1941).
34. This exception bears no relation to the preservation of federal jurisdiction
but merely appears to be an effort by the federal courts, in an equity capacity, to
prevent the perpetration of fraud within the state system. See Essanay Film Mfg.
Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358 (1922); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175
(1920); Marshall v. Holms, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). But see Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
35. The federal action must come prior to the state action for enforcement of the
unconstitutional statute in order to avoid the anti-injunction statute. See Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to
Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALs L.J. 1169, 1191 (1933). This is really
not an exception to the anti-injunction statute but merely outside the scope of the
statute. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally 1A J. Mooaz,
FSDXRAL PRAcics f 0.229[3], at 2641 (1965).
36. See Gunter v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906).

New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).

But see Toucey v.
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seeking the injunction,"' the federal courts have found exceptions to
the anti-injunction statute and have issued injunctions against state
proceedings.
The relative ease with which courts produced these and other
exceptions had indeed emaciated the force of the anti-injunction statute.
It was virtually disregarded in any situation in which it was felt that
the enjoining of state proceedings was necessary.
The "flexibility" of the anti-injunction statute, prior to 1941,
seemed to stem from the fact that it was interpreted as a legislative
enactment of the principles of comity."8 Reliance on comity, rather
than the wording of the statute, enabled the substitution of a rather discretionary doctrine for a very strictly worded statute. In addition,
the statute was generally regarded as being non-jurisdictional ;89 that
is, it does not limit federal equity jurisdiction, but rather limits the
instances where federal courts may provide injunctive remedies. Exceptions to this limitation occurred whenever a federal judge felt that
he might enjoin state court proceedings without offending the principles
of comity,40 and with the wide discretion afforded judges, this was
often. It is questionable, however, whether the extensions of federal
judicial power over the states is consistent with the original purpose
of the statute - to promote harmony between state and federal courts.
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,"' decided in 1941,
completely reversed the prevailing view toward liberal interpretation
of the anti-injunction statute. The Supreme Court ruled that a federal
court could not enjoin state court proceedings as to a cause of action
previously decided in a federal court against the plaintiff. This was
a complete rejection of the relitigation exception to the anti-injunction
statute.42 While the Court recognized the in rem exception 43 and both
the express and implied legislative exceptions, they impliedly rejected
all other judicially-made exceptions to the statute. In a majority
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court decided that the guiding
principle in interpreting the anti-injunction statute was "the duty of
'hands off' by the federal court in the use of the injunction to stay
'' 4
litigation in a state court. 3a

37. See United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1923). But see United
States v. Parkhurst Co., 176 U.S. 317 (1900). This exception has been recently
recognized in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924).
39. See Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292
(1924); Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924) ; Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d
579 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964); 1A J. MooRu F
RwnRAL
PRAcTIcz
fr 0.208 [3.-1], at 2313 (1965).
40. Judicial comity is defined as the principle in accordance with which the courts
of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of
another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect. BLACK'S LAW
DIc"ONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The flexibility of this doctrine depends on the
amount of discretion given the judiciary - wide discretionary powers permit general
disregard of comity under many circumstances, since its recognition is not obligatory.
Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
41. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
42. See note 33, supra and accompanying text.
43. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
43a. 314 U.S. at 132.
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This decision put new life into the anti-injunction statute and
significantly restricted federal interference with state court proceedings. It necessitated a literal reading of the statute and strict adherence
to the principles of comity. With the discretionary power of the
judges being greatly reduced, the previously malleable doctrine was
made more brittle.
Toucey caused much confusion in this area of federal injunctions
of state judicial proceedings. Prior to this case, it appeared that the
courts had a free reign in finding exception to it - the statute was
for all practical purposes dead. Toucey, however, completely reversed
this view without over-ruling any previous cases. . 4 The existing law
was thus distorted because all previous cases were made to fit within
the exceptions which the Court recognized.4 5 Evidently, congressional
disfavor with the interpretation of the statute in Toucey resulted in
1948 in its revision. For the revisor's notes indicate a clear intent
to reinstate all the pre-Toucey exceptions within the revision.4" These
exceptions, all covered by the broad wording of the statute itself relating
to instances when it would not apply, seemed to be an attempt to
eliminate the confusion and distortion of the law resulting from Toucey
without returning to the statute its previously ineffective form.
II.

28 U.S.C. SECTION 2283

-

THE REVISED STATUTE

The revised anti-injunction statute, section 2283 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, includes three specific exceptions.47 Federal
courts are given the power to enjoin state court proceedings to: 1)
protect and effectuate federal judgments; 2) aid in jurisdiction; and
3) comply with Acts of Congress which expressly authorize injunctions.
These broad exceptions seem to emcompass the numerous specific
exceptions to the statute which existed prior to Toucey. For example,
injunctions "in aid of jurisdiction" would include the exceptions implied
from the removal acts4" and the Act of 1851 limiting shipowners
liability49 as well as the in rem exception conceived by the courts.5"
All of these deal with the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over
a certain subject. Injunctions to "protect and effectuate judgments"
clearly reinstated the relitigation exception5 1 and over-ruled the narrow
44. It may be that cases allowing the relitigation exception were impliedly overruled, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1920), but the opinion

itself did not expressly over-rule a single case. Rather it attempted to fit all existing
cases into the exceptions which it recognized.
45. See 314 U.S. at 139-40; Comment, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court
Proceedings,74 HARV. L. Rzv. 726 (1961). See also 1A J. Moot, F4DrAL PACTICS
f"0.20812], 1965.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) (Historical and Revision Notes).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) provides that a court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except:
1) as expressly authorized by Congress,
2) where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
3) to protect and effectuate its judgments.
48. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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holding in Toucey. Finally, injunctions "expressly authorized by Act
of Congress" include the express exceptions created by the Interpleader
Act of 192652 and the Bankruptcy exception" within the old statute.
The interpretation of "expressly authorized," due to the myriad
of federal 5 4statutes providing equitable remedies, is potentially very
expansive.

The Revisor's note to section 2283 makes it clear that the revised
section restores the basic law as generally understood prior to Toucey.
It is not apparent, however, whether the intent of the statute's framers
was to merely restore the pre-Toucey exceptions or also to restore the
wide discretion which the courts had exercised prior to Toucey in finding new exceptions. The broad and carefully enumerated exceptions
within section 2283 would seem to imply that these were the only
exceptions to be recognized,5 5 for the statements are broad enough to
allow judicial discretion in interpreting them but not so broad as to
make the statute meaningless. Hence it would seem that the judicial
power to create new exceptions to the statute was eliminated.
Indeed, courts have been slow to find new exceptions to section
2283 in the twenty-two years since its passage. The pre-Toucey view
of virtual disregard for the statute has been greatly tempered. Although
most courts now recognize that the mandate of section 2283 may be
disregarded in the extraordinary case where compelling reasons so
warrant,5 6 there have been few cases where such an extraordinary
case has been presented. 7 Perhaps the reason for this was the caveat
issued by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America v. Richman Brothers Co. 8 There it was stated that "[b]y
that enactment [section 2283], Congress made clear beyond cavil
that the prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation."59 At any rate it appears from existing cases that lower federal
courts much prefer to fit injunctions issued against state proceedings
52. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
54. It is unclear whether the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) constitute an exception to the anti-injunction statute "expressly authorized" by Congress
and the court in this case did not decide the question. It is still open whether an
enactment must expressly provide for the enjoining of state proceedings to fall under
this exception. Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965). But see Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). In the context of a general grant of injunctive
power in section 10(1) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)
(1964), as an express authorization of Congress, see Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 501 (1954) ; cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348
U.S. 511 (1955).
55. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
56. E.g., Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
381 U.S. 939 (1964).
57. Id. Courts as in Baines have recognized that the statute may be overlooked
in extraordinary cases but they have not found many such cases.
58. 348 U.S. 511 (1955). It must be noted that the opinion here is by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter who also wrote the Toucey opinion. This case construes the new
statute, § 2283, in the same manner that Toucey construed the old statute, § 265 of
the Judiciary Act of 1911. But see Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220 (1957), which found, in another opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a new exception to § 2283 - where the United States itself is a party in interest.
59. 348 U.S. at 514.
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within the existing exceptions in the statute, even if some stretching is
required, rather than risk reversal in creating a new exception.6 0
Early cases following the 1948 revision interpreted the statute
very strictly. The Court in Richmond Brothers applied section 2283
literally by refusing to vacate a state court injunction prohibiting a
labor union from picketing at a corporation's place of business. The
union brought suit in the federal court claiming that the matter was
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,
and hence the state court had no jurisdiction. The majority, finding
both that there was never an exception to the old version of the
statute which would allow an injunction to protect the jurisdiction
of administrative agencies, and that the case did not fall within the
exceptions in section 2283, refused relief. Although it may have
been possible to find an exception to section 2283 "in aid of its jurisdiction" or as "expressly authorized by Congress" through a broad
interpretation of the statutory language, the Court construed the statute
narrowly, reasoning that section 2283 was not a statute of broad
general policy, but rather was a clear cut prohibition qualified only by
specifically defined exceptions."'
Nevertheless, there was a new exception created-a short time
later in Leiter Mineral, Inc. v. United States. 2 There the same Court
which decided Richmond Brothers held that the anti-injunction statute
did not apply to injunctions sought by the United States. The United
States sought to enjoin a state court proceeding over title to mineral
rights it allegedly owned and, at the same time, brought a federal
suit to quiet title. The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the
injunction, not under any statutory exception to section 2283, but
rather as an old and well known rule ".

.

. that statutes which in

general terms divest pre-existing rights (rights of federal courts apart
from the statute) . . . will not be applied to the sovereign without

express words to that effect.""6 In other Words, federal or public
rights cannot be hindered by implication in statutes. While a new
exception was thus created, Leiter Minerals was consistent with
the view that, at least in cases where the United States was not
directly concerned, there was a disposition toward strict construction
of section 2283. 64
In Baines v. City of Danville"' the Court recognized that there
were exceptional cases where the statute could be over-looked and
state proceedings enjoined, but only as a means of avoiding grave and
60. See Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.

1969) ; Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Cf. Baines v. City of
Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964).
61. 348 U.S. at 515.
62. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
63. Id. at 224.

64. See, e.g., Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964).

Also the principle that the United States is immune

from the bar of § 2283 is inapplicable to governmental boards, agencies, and corporations unless they can be properly equated to the sovereign. IA J. Moo"z, FxDxRALs
Pa cricz 0.208[3.-1], at 2315 (1965).
65. 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964).
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irreparable injury. They refused, however, to find such an exception
in this group of cases involving a state court injunction against civil
rights picketing and state criminal prosecutions of Negro picketers
for violation of local ordinances. Similar reasoning had been used
previously in Stefanelli v. Minard,66 a case where a criminal defendant
in a state proceeding sought a federal injunction against the use of
alleged unlawfully seized evidence against him. The request was
refused on the ground that there was no threat of irreparable injury.
The 'Court also considered the consequences of such an injunction and
decided that extensive disruption in state criminal proceedings would
result should it be issued.
These cases are typical of the view of federal courts toward the
anti-injunction statute prior to Machesky. They have been hesitant
to find new exceptions to section 2283 unless the United States itself
is involved. The courts evidently recognized the possibility that in
some cases the statute might be over-looked and state proceedings
enjoined, but they had not, before Machesky, found instances where
such action was warranted.
III.

A NEw EXCEPTION TO SECTION 2283

WHEN FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED

BY STATE COURTS

The court in Machesky held that where important first amendment
rights are violated by state court proceedings, 7 these proceedings may
be enjoined by a federal court despite section 2283. This holding was
based on the rationale that the principles of comity embodied in the
anti-injunction statute must yield where important public interests
to full dissemination of expression on public issues are abridged.6"
Although the court felt that the situation was extraordinary warranting departure from section 2283, it failed to consider whether any
irreparable injury resulted from the state proceedings.6 9 Thus, it
may well be that under Machesky, infringement upon public rights by
state courts is per se an exception to the anti-injunction statute.
The court did not reach the question of whether the Civil Rights
Acts70 provided an "expressly authorized" exception to section 2283.
66. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).

67. "Proceedings" include all steps taken or which may be taken in state court
or by its officers from institution to close of final proceedings and includes any action
taken to enforce a state court judgment. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935).
68. 414 F.2d at 291.
69. The cases which have recognized that the anti-injunction statute may be
overlooked in some extraordinary cases usually require that the injunction requested
be the only means to avoid grave and irreparable injury. See Sovereign Camp
Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924); Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S.
274 (1924) ; Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381

U.S. 939 (1964).
In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), it was held that federal equitable
relief was proper to prevent a substantial impairment of freedom of expression through
prosecution under an excessively broad state statute regulating expression. The
Machesky court evidently felt that this represented irreparableinjury to appellants in
Dombrowski. They therefore viewed the excessively broad state court order regulating expression as causing the same type of irreparable injury.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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The Supreme Court has described this as an open question,T ' and the
Machesky court evidently did not want to infringe on the power of
the higher court by deciding it. Also, the broad consequences of an
affirmative answer certainly were considered when the court decided
not to reach the question.7 2 If section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
was considered an "expressly authorized" exception, federal courts
might be forced to intervene in state criminal as well as civil proceedings in which Civil Rights Acts violations were present. Although a
federal court could employ the doctrine of abstention,7 8 it is doubtful
that it would in most cases. Hence, this could precipitate a great
number of federal suits attempting to enjoin state proceedings and have
a disruptive effect on both state and federal courts. This would
certainly contravene the principle behind the anti-injunction statute the avoidance of friction between state and federal courts. Still, it
may be that finding an "expressly authorized" exception within the
statute would be preferrable to creating an entirely new exception at
the expense of statutory language.
By deciding the case the way it did, the court in Machesky left
the decision as to whether to depart from section 2283 and enjoin
state court proceedings dealing with civil rights to be decided on a
case by case basis. Although, as said previously, there may be some
who interpret Machesky as permitting an exception to section 2283
whenever public rights are infringed in state proceedings, a better
reading would be that the facts and circumstances of each case should
be examined to see if the extraordinary case warranting federal
injunction is made out. This was essentially the status of the law
before the decision, except that now the still unclear requirements for
over-looking section 2283 have been made 74
less stringent, and the federal
courts have been given greater discretion.
In applying first amendment rights through the fourteenth amendment to the states, the court must find state action. Although this
question was left to be decided by the district court on remand, undoubtedly the state action requirement may be fulfilled by the action
71. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
72. Cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951). Here the consequences
of federal interference with state criminal proceedings through the Civil Rights Act
were considered. It was decided that such interference would be extremely disruptive
to both courts and no injunction was issued. See also 50 CALIF. L. Rrv. 718 (1962).
73. This is the discretionary doctrine under which a federal court may decide
not to intervene in state court action even if they have the power. The federal court
will direct the parties to pursue state court remedies while sometimes retaining jurisdiction and awaiting the outcome of the state court litigation. If this outcome meets
with federal disapproval, then action may be taken to prevent its enforcement.
Normally, however, if the doctrine is envoked, the federal courts will stay completely
out of the case. For a discussion of the relation between the abstention doctrine and
the federal anti-injunction statute, see Knowlton, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute
and the Related Abstention Doctrine, 21 S.C.L. Riv. 313 (1969).
74. Compare Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) with Baines v.
City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1969) and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511

(1955).
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of state courts as in Shelley v. Kramer.7" It was suggested, however,
that on remand the district court analogize the state court order with
the case where first amendment rights 'have been restricted by unconstitutional municipal ordinances to make more clear the state or
local action. 76 Further discussion of this problem is not warranted,
and it will suffice to say that the district court should not have any
trouble in finding state action.
Perhaps the leading case dealing with the infringement by a state
on the type of public rights in question" is Dombrowski v. Pfister.78
While this case was distinguished in Machesky on the facts, its rationale
was nevertheless helpful in determining the status of the constitutional
rights involved. In Dombrowski, a civil rights group sought a federal
injunction against the enforcement, 'by state officials, of an allegedly
unconstitutional subversive activities law against members of the group.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded a district court decision
refusing relief, finding that the enforcement of the statute would impair
the freedom of expression to the point of causing irreparable injury
to appellants. Equitable relief was therefore appropriate. They read
section 2283 as not precluding an injunction against the institution of
state proceedings but only a bar to enjoining suits already instituted, 7
hence the enforcement of the law in question could be prevented. The
Machesky court distinguished the case since the injunction issued
there did not come within the scope of the anti-injunction statute. Still
Dombrowski was clearly directed to protecting first amendment rights,
the primary principle of the Machesky decision and may give some
support to the Machesky holding.
Similar reasoning appears later in City of Greenwood v. Peacock.80
That opinion contains dictum which, as interpreted in Machesky, is
to the effect that if the interests sought to be protected by Dombrowski
are offended by a state court proceeding, that proceeding may be
enjoined despite section 2283. While this reading of City of Greenwood may be somewhat strained,"1 it reiterates the importance of
75. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

This case held that the actions of state courts and

judicial officers in their official capacities are actions of the states within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment.

76. 414 F.2d at 286.

77. E.g., Picketing, marching, general dissemination of civil rights information,
organizing civil rights movements and their activities, etc.

78. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

79. Id. at 484 n.2. See Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935), which defined
proceedings" as all steps from the institution of a suit to the close of final process.
But see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908).
80. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
81. Id. at 829. The court in Greenwood stated that where a state court proceeding would deny an individual his rights under the first amendment, he "may
under some circumstances obtain an injunction in federal court." The Machesky
court interpreted this as meaning that a state proceeding may be enjoined any time
these rights are offended regardless of the anti-injunction statute. It is more probable, however, that the term "some circumstances" was merely referring to the specific
exceptions within § 2283 - so that an injunction could issue only where the circumstances fell within these exceptions. Another possibility is "under some circumstances"
could be only before state proceedings were instituted as in Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965). At any rate, this dictum is at best unclear and reliance on it
by Machesky is tenuous.
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Dombrowski in defining interests which warrant protection from state
courts,8 2 and what steps may be taken in protecting them. While

neither of these cases dealt directly with the anti-injunction statute,
they do show the disposition of the Supreme Court toward protecting
civil rights groups from state persecution. The Machesky court evidently felt that the rights to freedom of expression for these groups
could therefore be considered paramount to judicial principles of
comity 83 There was no precedent, however, for such a holding in
the face of section 2283, despite its historical background,84 so existing
case law had to be extended to create a new exception to the antiinjunction statute.
Limiting somewhat their opinion, the court in Machesky spoke
primarily of public rights protected by the first amendment. They
purposely excluded any rights under the first amendment which may
be termed as private rights. The distinction between the two seems
anything but clear. Public rights are described as relating to the
citizen in his capacity as a governor - his right to vote, to disseminate
information, to influence public opinion, among others.8 5 Private
rights, on the other hand, are those relating to the citizen as one of the
governed - his subjectivity to criminal laws, his rights to governmental protection for his private affairs, etc."8 There seems little
reason to break down these rights so minutely, other than perhaps to
narrowly limit the holding in the case. Also, it is possible that such
a distinction was a convenient way in which the court could find support
for its disregard of section 2283.
The Machesky court relied on an extension of the reasoning
espoused in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,a7 which held that
section 2283 was inapplicable to injunctions sought by the United
States. It was decided that the potential frustration of superior federal
interests resulting from a literal application of section 2283 to the
United States could not have been the intent of Congress. This
reference to national interests -

superior federal interests -

was

82. An example is public interests, specifically civil rights demonstration activities. Note also that the court in Dombrowski chose not to invoke the abstention doctrine (see note 73, supra), showing that they felt that some federal action was proper.
83. See generally Comment, Federal Removal and Injunction to Protect Political
Expression and Racial Equality: A Proposed Change, 57 CALn'. L. Rzv. 694 (1969).
84. Many cases have espoused the view that the principles of comity may yield
in order to prevent grave and irreparable injury. E.g., Sovereign Camp Woodmen of
the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924); Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924).
Even though § 2283 is supposedly a legislative enactment of the principles of comity,
no cases have held that the statute must yield to prevent injury. The statute has
yielded only within the specific exceptions contained in it and when the United States
itself has sought relief. It has been speculated in some cases however, like Baines
v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964), that
§ 2283 would yield in the extraordinary case where irreparable injury was shown.
The Machesky court extended this speculation into a holding and then proceeded
to find that the "extraordinary case" did exist and that federal interference was
therefore proper.
85. See 414 F.2d at 288-90; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1965).
86. See 414 F.2d at 289; cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
87. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
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interpreted by Machesky as including, by implication, all public rights.
This was a starting point for the conclusion that section 2283 could
be overlooked in order to protect public rights.
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,8 which involved a stockholder suit
charging corporate violation of S.E.C. regulations, was cited as
support for the proposition that a private party, not just the United
States, could obtain an injunction against state proceedings to protect
public rights. The case did point out the importance of federal or
public interests, but did not really create a new exception to section
2283. Rather section 16 of the Clayton Act89 was read as an "expressly
authorized" exception to section 2283, allowing a private individual
as well as the S.E.C. itself to obtain injunctions." It would seem,
therefore, that this distinction between public rights and private rights
is important simply in determining whether an "expressly authorized"
exception to section 2283 exists. 1 At any rate, protection of public
rights was not, prior to Machesky grounds for finding a new exception
92
to the anti-injunction statute where the United States was not a party.
While these cases offered no direct support for the action taken
in Machesky, the cognizance they took of public rights was significant.
The favorable treatment these rights received, in relation to section
2283, helped the court to determine that the extraordinary case warranting federal interference did exist. If Gittlin allowed an exception
within the statute to protect public rights, then it was within the
Machesky court's discretion, as they reasoned, to form a new exception
to protect the same type of rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In reaching the desired result, the Machesky court could have
determined that section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"s was,
because it provides equitable and other appropriate relief for deprivations of basic constitutional rights under color of law, within the statutory "expressly authorized" exception to section 2283. Such a holding
would have, at least superficially, preserved the integrity of the words
88. 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).

90. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros. Co., 348
U.S. 511 (1955); International Union of Electrical Workers v. Underwood Corp.,
219 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1955). The situation in labor relations is different since the
sole power to seek injunctive relief to prevent violations of the National Labor Relations Act is with the National Labor Relations Board. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (d), 160 (1)
(1964).
91. See, e.g., Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard C.L.R.R., 418 F.2d 387 (5th
Cir. 1969), which used reasoning similar to that in Gittlin to allow a corporation to
enjoin the attempted state court suit of another corporation. The first corporation's
land was being condemned by the second in violation of § 1(18) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1964). The court decided that the Interstate
Commerce Act provided an "expressly authorized" exception to § 2283, allowing the

injunction but did not create a new exception to the anti-injunction statute.

92. See Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

381 U.S. 939 (1964).

93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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of section 2283 and conformed to the prevailing view that the statute
is to be read strictly. The court rejected this course. Its prevailing consideration was probably that such a holding would open the door for an
unwelcomed number of litigants and defendants to try to escape the
justice available on the state level. Although the abstention doctrine
would still be available to block the flood, the result nevertheless would
be potentially disruptive of the principles of comity the anti-injunction
statute is supposed to reflect.
As an alternative, the Machesky court gave life to a new exception to the anti-injunction statute with seeming disregard for the
teachings of Frankfurter in Toucey and the theory behind the subsequent reenactment of the statute. The exception is based on the overriding importance of the public rights involved in the case; i.e., the
political rights of free expression embodied in the first amendment.
The court felt 'that the principles of comity embodied in the statute
should not be allowed to prevent protection of these rights. The holding
can be taken on two levels. One espousing a Frankfurtian outlook
might bemoan the beginning of a return to the pre-Toucey approach
to the anti-injunction statute. The "clear-cut prohibition qualified only
by specifically defined exceptions" referred to in Richmond Brothers"
may well be seen as giving way to a new series of judicially-fashioned
exceptions. On the other hand, one can view the Machesky rationale
as being compelled by previous Supreme Court cases, such as Dombrowski, dealing with first amendment rights.
Dombrowski granted an injunction against the institution of state
proceedings on the ground that comity and abstention principles must
yield in the face of the need to protect the first amendment freedoms.
The fact that the state proceedings had been instituted in Machesky
(which, in contrast to Dombrowski, makes section 2283 applicable)
should not require a different result. As has been shown in the past,
exceptions have been read into the statute where federal legislation
bars the bringing of state actions even though the statute is only
supposed to apply when the state proceedings have already commenced.95
This would indicate that the two situations are not always kept distinct,
the theory being that if you enjoin the bringing of the action then in
order to make the legislation effective, you must be equally as able
to enjoin the action after it has begun. Dombrowski, in allowing the
injunction prior to the commencement of the state action, could be
viewed as requiring the Machesky result on the same rationale. In
addition, viewing the anti-injunction act as an embodiment of the
principles of comity, its application should not require a different result
than was reached in Dombrowski. In essence, both cases involve the
weighing of considerations of federalism against the guarantees of the
first amendment. Logic and consistency would seem to demand that
the scales register the same result each time.
94. See note 61 supra.
95. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.

